Abstract: The concept of schema was advanced by Frederic Bartlett to provide the basis for a radical temporal alternative to traditional spatial storage theories of memory. Bartlett took remembering out of the head and situated it at the enfolding relation between organism and environment. Through an activity of 'turning around upon schema', humans can create ruptures in their seamless flow of activity in an environment and take active control over our mind and behavior. This paper (1) contextualizes Bartlett's concept of schema within broader theoretical developments of his time; (2) examines its temporal dimensions in relation to embodied action and memory 'reconstruction', (3) shows how these temporal dynamics are later abandoned by early cognitive 'schema' theories which revert to the metaphor of storage and (4) explores strategies by which we might fruitfully bring schema back into psychology as an embodied, dynamic, temporal, holistic and social concept.
Introduction
No other concept in Bartlett's oeuvre has generated as much attention as 'schema', except perhaps the related concept 'reconstruction'. Psychology is today littered with references to 'story schema', 'self--schema', 'gender schema', 'event schema', and a wide range of other words combined with schema. i Add to these the derivative concepts of 'script' and 'frame' and one begins to get a sense of how widely and variably the concept is used. At a very general level contemporary psychologists have defined schema as a knowledge structure in the head that is used in the storage of information. This is somewhat ironic because Bartlett (1932) intended to utilize the concept to develop an alternative to the storage theory of memory. For him, schema was to provide the basis for a theory of remembering that was embodied, dynamic, temporal, holistic and social. Bartlett (1932) , however, provided only a hesitant and sketchy account rather than a fully developed theory. This left the concept of schema wide open for reconstruction. Since Bartlett, psychologists of different generations and orientations have assimilated schema into their own frameworks, which Bartlett's reconstructive schema theory would have itself predicted.
The present paper explores the concept of schema's origins, its place within Bartlett's thought and its successive reconstructions by others after him. First, I present the trace theory of memory, which Bartlett was reacting against in developing his own theory. The memory trace was the dominant metaphor of memory in physiological, psychological and philosophical discourses of Bartlett's time, and perhaps our own as well. Second, I argue that Bartlett took a functionalist approach to memory, leading him to reject the usefulness of literal recall in an ever--changing world. Rather than treating memory as a substance he explores it as a situated activity made possible by a myriad of different processes. Third, I discuss Head's (1920) concept of schema together with Bartlett's critique and extension of it. For Head 'schema' was a purely embodied concept, whereas for Bartlett it takes on social and reflexive significance. Fourth, I outline remembering as a self--reflective process and explicate the phrase 'turning around upon [ones] own schema and constructing them afresh ' (p. 206) .
Fifth, I look at the different waves of reconstructing 'schema' since Bartlett and in so doing make an argument for reconstructing schema as a temporal, dynamic, embodied, holistic and social process in future research.
The Trace Theory of Memory
Bartlett's 'theory of remembering' is explicitly developed as an alternative to the trace theory of memory, which has dominated western thinking about memory for two and half centuries (Danziger, 2008) . Plato was the first to posit it in his Theaetetus, where he had us imagine that there was a wax tablet in the mind called 'the memory', into which new experiences leave an imprint. When we remember an experience we simply read off what was impressed on the wax. This sets the stage for regarding memory as just a copy of experience, a faded form of perception. This idea was most clearly developed by English philosophers such as Berkeley, Hume and John Stuart Mill. For them old knowledge was represented as a stored collection of distinct mental images.
Although contemporary theorists have moved away from the specific metaphor of wax--tablet, the root metaphor of memory as individuated marks on a surface has persisted down the ages, such that we now speak of memories as being like 4 code magnetically inscribed on a computer hard disk or physically inscribed in brain as an "engram" (literally "that which is converted into writing"). Bartlett (1932, p. 198) described the trace theory in general terms thus:
When any specific event occurs some trace, or some group of traces, is made and stored up in the organism or mind. Later, an immediate stimulus re--excites the trace, or group of traces, and, provided a further assumption is made (…) that the trace somehow carries with it a temporal sign, the re--excitement appears to be equivalent to recall.
This notion of spatial storage of memories is now so deeply embedded in our thinking that we tend to take the figurative assumptions of the metaphor as literally true. Danziger (2002) has argued that the metaphor leads us to assume memory is a mental faculty literally 'in the head'; that it is naturally divisible into three distinct phases, now called 'encoding', 'storage' and 'retrieval'; that memories are stored as individuated 'traces', now presumed to exist in the brain; and that memories retain the same meaning irrespective of the context in which they take part. Traditional experiments on memory never put these assumptions into question with their use of wordlists, associative pairs and segmented stories, their analytic focus on counting 'items' remembered, forgotten or distorted, and their treatment of the laboratory as a kind of social vacuum. Ebbinghaus's (1885 Ebbinghaus's ( /1991 classic study The Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology is typical in this regard. Bartlett's criticisms of it are revealing: First, he questions the tendency to consider humans as passively 5 reacting to stimuli. Although psychology is now willing to accept the mind is active, it is still studied by most psychologists using a neo--behaviorist methodology whereby some stimulus is varied (independent variable), which causes the individual to respond in a particular way (as measured by the dependent variable). This approach is guided by a search for "efficient causality" rather than "agent causality" (see Harré 2002) . Second, Bartlett points out that simplifying the stimulus does not necessarily simplify the response. Subjects still tended to give non--sense syllables a meaning. Moreover, this very attempt to use simple and meaningless stimuli, so as to isolate the response, results in wholly artificial conditions with little relation to its workings in everyday life. Lastly, experiments are not social vacuums; experiments are social contexts that channel human responses in particular directions.
From Storage to Action: Bartlett's Functionalism
In contrast to the trace theory that treats memory as an isolated mental faculty, Bartlett starts with a whole organism actively involved with its environment.
The mind is taken 'out of the head' and situated in the ongoing transactions between a person and his or her environment. ii From this perspective, remembering is considered as a situated activity, bringing together multiple different processes, to act in the world. Mind and memory are here not separate entities or substances but sets of processes contributing to environmental adaptation. In Bartlett's own words:
I have never regarded memory as a faculty, as a reaction narrowed and ringed around, containing all its peculiarities and all explanations within itself. I have 6 regarded it rather as one achievement in the line of the ceaseless struggle to master and enjoy a world full of variety and rapid change. (Bartlett 1932, p. 314) A number of theorists from around the world at this time were developing a functionalist approach with similar assumptions (e.g., Dewey, Mead, Vygotsky, Baldwin, Bergson, von Uexkull, etc) . iii They were all reacting against the tendency to separate mind from activity in the world and describe it simply in terms of its inner contents. Titchener, for example, used a method of self--observation to describe the contents of mind. The problem was not the focus on mental contents as such, but rather investigating them in this way, they were removed from the concrete thoughts and feelings of everyday life and the function that they had there. With functionalism the emphasis shifts to an analysis of the conditions under which a particular psychological or behavioral response occurs. These thinkers likewise rejected the opposing behaviorist approach for its exclusion of mind and its analysis of reactions as simply determined by some external stimulus and artificially separated from the broader context of action.
In applying a functionalist approach to the study of memory, the question of memory capacity or accuracy becomes subordinated to the question of how remembering helps a person function in the environment in which they live.
According to Bartlett, literal recall is in most conditions dysfunctional, whereas constructive remembering, which flexibly adjusts itself to the context of occurrence, is of great utility, given that the environment changes.
7
So--called 'literal', or accurate, recall is an artificial construction of the armchair, or of the laboratory. Even if it could be secured, in the enormous majority of instances it would be biologically detrimental. Life is a continuous play of adaptation between changing response and varying environment. Only in a relatively few cases-and those mostly the production of an elaborately guarded civilization-could the retention unchanged of the effects of experience be anything but a hindrance. (Bartlett 1932, p. 16) Bartlett's rather low option of literal recall is almost the exact opposite of most cognitive approaches to memory, which focus almost exclusively on accuracy as the ultimate standard for evaluating memory. Thus, 'construction' is considered a vice of memory and has rarely been explored as more than a process leading to memory 'distortion'. By contrast, in Bartlett's account 'construction' was indicative of the directedness and creativity of human responses, which could not be adequately studied with a methodology that simply considered the stimulus as determining the organism's response or that removed the organism's response from the environment in which it normally occurs.
Head's Schema Theory
In the 1910s Bartlett invented a powerful methodology for studying remembering as a more everyday social activity, yet it was not until nearly two decades later that he was to articulate a general theory of remembering to account for his results. Inspiration for this theory came from several sources (Northway 1940a) Place the patient's affected arm in front of him on the bed, allowing him to see the position in which it lies; close his eyes, and in most cases he will see a mental picture of his hand. Then change its position while his eyes remain closed and he will continue to see a picture of the hand in its old position. Moreover, if localization is not affected, he will name correctly the spot stimulated but will refer it to the position in which he visualizes the hand. The visual image of the limb remains intact, although the power of appreciating changes in position is abolished. (Head 1920, p. 605) A physiologist, Munk (1890) , was the first to pose the question of how earlier movements in a chain are able to continue to exert an influence on latter movements, as happens with bodily skills. He answered that this is possible 9 because mental images of our body movements are stored in the cortex.
However, Head showed that the image function remains intact even when the ability to seamlessly coordinate serial movements is lost, as in the above example. Head concluded that appreciation of postural change must be separate from the functioning of images. The former is a more fundamental process and operates largely below the level of conscious awareness, whereas images function consciously. Head calls this fundamental unconscious process "schema", which he defines as "That combined standard against which all subsequent changes in posture are registered before they enter consciousness". He (Head 1920, p. 605--606) Thus, schema is a holistic and constantly revised record of one's position, which provides the baseline for one's next movement-for example, to make a step forward one has to be aware of the current position of one's leg. Schema is a kind of active and continuously revised memory, rather than one put away into storage only to be retrieved at a later time. It is a generalization but not an abstraction of past experience. Head discusses the phenomena of the phantom limb as a vivid example of the operation of schema. Whereas above we saw the effects of schematic breakdown, the phantom limb demonstrates what happens when schema remains intact while ones body is suddenly dramatically changed by the loss of a limb. Although the limb is no longer there, patients register it as changing position alongside their entire body as they had done before; it remains part of the "combined standard". In one clinical case, the patient lost a finger several months before losing their entire arm. As a result the patient's phantom arm had four fingers rather than five. Head also reports a case in which a patient's phantom limb disappears with a lesion that causes schematic breakdown, as described above.
Bartlett's Elaboration of Schema
Bartlett is sympathetic to Head's theory but offers a number of terminological critiques. Reviewing them will help us to understand what he wanted to do with the concept. First, he thinks Head gives away far too much to earlier investigators when he speaks of the cortex as "a storehouse of past impressions", thus evoking the storage metaphor. A store is a place you put things in the hope to find them later in same conditions they were put there, whereas schema are said to be constantly active, developing and influenced by the present context.
Head rejects the image theory of body movement, whereby present movement is compared to images of past movement, but he implicitly accepts assumptions of the storage analogy. Second, Head (1920) uses the phrase "rising into consciousness" to describe the workings of schema, whereas Bartlett rejects a strict separation between conscious and unconscious processes. If anything schema operates below the level of self--reflective awareness and as such is not available to introspection (Bartlett 1932; In this passage, Bartlett is all too aware of the danger of dividing and fixating a holistic, living, moving process by using technical language to describe it. We are told instead that schema should be understood as always operating 'en masse', 'active' and 'developing'. In spite of these pre--emptive measures it will be shown below that early cognitive psychology turns schema into the static structure that Bartlett tried to avoid. Given the problems with the term "schema" it is somewhat surprising that Bartlett continues to use it in Remembering, although he also frequently uses different terms, reflecting other influences on his thought. His continued use of 'schema' is likely done to express Head's influence on his theory. Bartlett's preferred names for schema are also revealing. He says, It would probably be best to speak of 'active, developing patterns'; but the word 'pattern', too, being now very widely and variously employed, has its own difficulties; and it, like 'schema', suggests a greater articulation of detail than is normally found. I think probably the term 'organised setting' approximates most closely and clearly to the notion required. (p. 201)
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Bartlett had previously used the words 'pattern', 'organized' and 'setting' in other contexts. In his early experiments on perceiving and imagining, Bartlett (1916a) explained how any psychological response involved an 'effort after meaning', an active process of connecting given material to a "setting" or "scheme". For example, subjects named a briefly presented ambiguous figure an
"anchor" or a "pre--historic battleaxe", thereby rendering their relation to it more definite. This is similar to Brentano's idea of mental acts as always pointing beyond themselves (i.e., having "intentionality") or the Gestalt idea of figure--ground relations. Thus, as early as 1916 "setting" refers to a self--generated context for action and experience, which itself evolves with the event.
Similarly, in his 1923 book Psychology and Primitive Culture, Bartlett frequently uses the phrase 'cultural pattern' to describe folk conventions, such as the distinctive styles of decorative art forms one finds in different social groups (Haddon, 1894) . Social groups have the tendency to work any incoming foreign element of culture into their existing 'cultural patterns'. Like schema these patterns are 'plastic', in that they adapt themselves to fit new material while at the same time remaining relatively stable across time. Thus, cultural patterns are to the group as schemata are to the individual (Wagoner, in press ). At both levels, a flexible pattern is imposed on the incoming material, which changes the material but in so doing stabilizes it against additional dramatic changes (Collins, 2006) . The above quote, however, indicates that by 1932 Bartlett was growing dissatisfied with the word 'pattern'. He ultimately prefers the term 'organised setting', which better highlights that schema operate at the developing 13 transaction between organism and environment, rather than being a purely cognitive phenomena (i.e., a mental representation).
Having expressed his terminological objections, Bartlett (1932, pp. 200--201) proceeds to define schema as:
an active organization of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well--adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behavior, a particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass… All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build up an active, organized setting.
Driving a car, painting a picture, walking up the stairs or recalling one's phone number are directed activities that operate as a seamless flow without self--reflection entering into them. They require the unconscious coordination of a series of acts in time and space through a certain attunement to the environment. When we first learn to drive a car, for example, the series of movements needed do not easily flow from one to the other, but with time we learn to do them without reflection. At this point, the activity of driving functions as a 'unitary mass' and cannot be analytically subdivided into separate actions without losing the quality of the whole. It is the massed and unitary effects of previous reactions that provide the basis for a new response while engaged in an activity. This is not a mechanical plan wherein one distinct movement follows another, but rather dynamic relating to the environment against the background 14 of previous experience. In other words, schemata provide an organism with a general orientation to its environment and means of flexibly coordinating action within it. What is given in the environment is unconsciously 'fit' to our changing schemes of action and experience. Bartlett (1932) gives the following example:
When I make the stroke I do not, as a matter of fact, produce something Many details of the environment will not have any relevance to the activity and thus will not be attended to. In a later publication, Bartlett (1935) compares remembering a series of cards, as they are played in a game of bridge versus simply dealing them haphazardly. In bridge there will be an active interest in remembering the cards to meet the needs of the game. By contrast, the haphazard presentation resembles more paradigm of recall demanded by 15 Ebbinghaus' method. Bartlett is emphatic that it is the former ability to remember, as part of a whole living social activity, that is needed for general functioning in everyday life.
Turning Around upon Schemata
The most fundamental way in which the past influences the present is by the simple action of schemata as an organized stream of activity, as happens in habits and basic skills. This, however, does not describe remembering in the full human sense of the word. For Bartlett, that involves creating a discontinuity in the seamless stream of action, in order to locate specific information from the past. For example, while moving through my routine of preparing to leave the house in the morning, I cannot locate my keys. I suddenly become self--conscious.
Bartlett would say an attitude (or "orientation") is set up, which is then directed toward the events of the previous day in order to identify where I left my keys. I begin to create distinctions within my duration of experience-today versus yesterday and here versus there. This enables me to distance myself from the here and now environment, and as such widen my possibilities of action within it. At this point the environment becomes dual-I become simultaneously involved in a present and past environment. The latter is used to self--reflectively control action in the present. Bartlett (1932, p. 206) Bartlett (1935, p. 224) gives the example of an enthusiastic journalist's account of a cricket match: "To describe the batting of one man he finds it necessary to refer to a sonata of Beethoven; the bowling of another reminds him of a piece of beautifully wrought rhythmic prose written by Cardinal Newman".
Here different schemata cross and invade one another, causing the organism to turn around upon them. In this process, the material is put into a new setting (in the above music and poetry) so as to further current tendencies (writing a description of the event).
In Bartlett's own experiments, he observed that the setting of an experiment sets up a predominant interest or attitude in the subject. This is the 'attitude' or 'general impression' that the subject then attempts to justify in the act of remembering. The subject usually proceeds to chronologically recall the material that is the focus of the task. This may at first move smoothly forward but at some point the subject will pause and ask him or herself 'what must have gone here?'
At this point, subject enters a self--reflexive mode in which schema are actively manipulated to 'fill in gaps' in memory, analogous to the way the enthusiastic journalist is reminded of Beethoven in describing a cricket match. What is unclear in this account is how precisely this 'turning around on [ones] own schema' is possible- Bartlett (1932) acknowledges when he says 'I wish I knew how it was done' (p. 206). Later he defends the phrase as a 'description' rather than an 'explanation' of the process (see Bartlett, 1967 Bartlett, /2008 . iv In accordance with his functionalist perspective, Bartlett (1937) does provide a number of conditions through which a rupture arises in ones stream of action and experience:
1) Lack of harmony in co--operative effort 2) Sudden and unexpected change of environment stimulation 3) Clash of testimony about certain practically significant events 4) Swift surging up of some definite sensorial image which conflicts notably with whatever is being done or perceived at the moment.
It is only the fourth in this list (the image) that Bartlett elaborates on in any detail. Therefore, in what follows I focus on explicating it as a mechanism of self--reflection in remembering. Somewhat confusingly Bartlett uses the word "image"
to describe both visual and auditory imagery, though these two have different characteristics for him. In his experiments, he frequently discusses the conditions under which images arise and how they in term shape the process of remembering. For example, he says that subjects that rely on visual imagery tend to proceed in a jerky or bumpy manner, mix up the original order of presentation, and are often confident of their memories, though objectively unfounded. This is in contrast to those that rely more on 'vocalisation' (i.e., subvocal speech), who tend to better retain an order and proceed more smoothly, because language is a linear medium and meanings are given with it directly, though their attitude is often one of doubt.
Later, when outlining his general theory of remembering he gives a distinctive function to images "to pick items out of 'schemata', and to rid the organism of over--determination by the last preceding member of a given series" (p. 209).
Bartlett ( Although experiences are particularized through images it is a mistake to think of them as passively received copies of experience, as in the storage theory of memory. Instead, they are differentiations within organized settings, selected 19 (i.e., 'picked out' or 'unpacked') as a result of the active interests of the subject.
They also change according to those interests-they are 'living' rather than 'static'. In an earlier publication, Bartlett (1925) theorized that images arose when there was a conflict of tendencies to action (i.e., when a reaction is held up)
as a way of helping the person to choose between alternatives. But images can also be dysfunctional, as they tend to overly particularize the details of a situation such that the person loses the dynamic whole. For example, forming an image of one's opponent's moves in tennis is likely to be a distraction in an ongoing game; however, one could later use images of the game to reflect on one's strategy.
At this point, we are in a position to understand Bartlett's (1932) 
Reconstruction of Schema, Phase 1: Bartlett's Students
As we have seen above, Bartlett put forward a radically new theory of remembering with the help of the concept of schema; however, the concept remained rather sketchy and underdeveloped in his work. Bartlett put it aside and moved on to other projects. In the three decades following the publication of
Remembering the sketchy state of the schema concept changed little. There were only a couple sustained attempts to develop it-many memory studies done in
Britain did acknowledge the "schema theory" but did not attempt to elaborate it in any significant way. In a series of articles in the British Journal of Psychology Bartlett's students Oldfield and Zangwill (1942a , 1942b , 1943a , 1943b ) did develop a sustained and meticulous theoretical discussion of the concept and how it had been used by thinkers since Head; however, not long after Bartlett's death Oldfield (1972) and Zangwill (1972) publically declared that the concept of schema would best be forgotten. During this first period of reconstruction, perhaps the only substantial methodological development of Bartlett's schema concept was the work of Mary L. Northway.
Northway spent 1935--1936 working with Bartlett at Cambridge, and submitted
her PhD thesis at the University of Toronto on "Bartlett's concept of Schema", which was published in the British Journal of Psychology (1936 Psychology ( , 1940a Psychology ( , 1940b .
In the middle article (1940a), she carefully teases apart four different (though not necessarily exclusive) uses that Bartlett makes of the schema concept (viz. as a force, form, storehouse and apperceptive mass) and then connects these to different influences on his thought (viz., Head, Ward and Rivers). To bring clarity to the concept, in such a way that it might lead to methodological innovations,
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she invents her own definition of schema as "what the subject makes (creates or develops) from the given material (or situation)" (Northway 1940b, p. 35) . This is not a definition that Bartlett himself gives, but is nonetheless closely aligned with Bartlett's broader theoretical and methodological framework, particularly in his notion of an "effort after meaning". With this definition as her guide,
Northway develops a number of clever experimental studies with children in Toronto school classrooms.
Her first study uses Bartlett's method of serial reproduction to explore how age and social background provide different schemata through which children can "make something out of the material". Three stories of differing difficulty were also used (including War of the Ghosts) to explore how this might affect schematic differences in recall. Northway (1936) recruits children from three different schools:
(1) A private girl's school, run by the Church of England according to longstanding traditions;
(2) A public school in the slum area of town, whose student body was composed mostly of first to fourth generation immigrants; and (3) A country school, described as a 'progressive' boarding school for boys on the outskirts of the city.
For the first two schools (i.e., the private and public) she works with groups of both 10 and 15 year old students, while for the country school she only had access to 14 year olds. Students in the private school had a relatively 23 homogeneous social background compared to the diverse student body of the public school. Bartlett (1932) had found in his serial reproduction experiments that stories and images would reach a conventional form, at which point they would remain relatively stable. Northway extends this finding by pointing out in her own study that "the less stable social group [i.e., public school children] gave many more modifications and importations than the comparable age group in a more stabilized social setting [i.e., the private school]" (Northway, 1940a, p. 325).
Like Bartlett (1932) , she also notes that remembering is interest and meaning driven and that these are socially shaped. To test the idea, one of the stories she uses was constructed to contain a diverse range of items, such as basketball, rugby, scripture and sewing. Certain items were highly remembered in some groups and hardly at all in others. For example, the majority of public and private school children remembered basketball, while children in the country school did not remember it at all. For them rugby was the most central activity (which they remembered the most of all the groups) followed by 'manual training' which only a few children in the other schools mentioned. Different patterns of recall between the groups were also found for the items in the story War of the Ghosts, but these differences were less marked.
There were also important age differences in story recall. Not only did the younger children (10 yrs) remember less than the older children (15 yrs), but they also were much more likely to import and substitute their own ideas into the stories. Furthermore, there was a difference in younger and older children's 'recasting' the form, setting and style of the stories. Recasting was usually done by either telling a new story within the same setting as the original, or elaborating some detail in the original into a new setting (e.g., in War of the Ghosts the death at the end is selected and used to construct another story about a death). Younger children often created their own 'active centers' to the story based on some interest they had, rather than being constrained by the story's structure. Northway (1936, p. 22 ) mentions a number of ways younger children differ from older in recasting the story:
(i) Their recasts show more diversity as they occur in various chains for any one story. (ii) They change the story more abruptly. The whole recast is apt to appear suddenly, whereas with the older children it gradually creeps in through several links. (iii) They recast the story earlier in the series the older ones do.
Perhaps the most interesting of all the age differences comes from an analysis of the 'modifications' made to different items of the story. Northway (1936) follows Bartlett (1932) closely here in her typology of modifications. She lists: (1) conventionalization, change toward common phraseology within a given social group; (2) rationalization, change that creates a more reasonable and coherent story; (3) reversal, in which phrases are turned into their opposite; and (4) substitution, where one reason or activity is changed to another of a different kind. Conventionalization was common to both younger and older children, but rationalization, reversals and substitutions were only made by the older children. Thus, we see a clear qualitative difference in the management of 25 schema as a function of age. Northway's (1936 Northway's ( , 1940a first study demonstrated the influence of social background, age and the difficulty of the material on the schematic organization of recall. In a follow--up study, also done with school children, she investigates "the differences occurring in remembering when the learning methods themselves are devised to allow the children more or less freedom in 'making something out of the material'" (Northway, 1940b, p. 22) . To do this, she assigns children to one of three different learning methods:
(1) Repetition: students learn through rote repetition drills.
(2) Repetition combined with discussion: drills are supplemented with some discussion of the text. Children read a story about a pirate's adventures aloud two times and on the next day they learned it by one of the three learning methods. Three days later the children were asked to "write a story, pretending you are Don Durk [pirate protagonist] and that you are sitting at home telling your friends of yourself and your adventure" (Northway 1940b, p. 26) . This was meant to create an open context of recall to test children's ability to work flexibly with the material that they had learned rather than simply reproduce it by rote. She finds that children in the project group were much more likely to add a temporal and spatial context to the story, add new nouns related to the story theme and to extend the topic to 26 include new events. In short, these children were much more capable of reconstructing the story material into new forms than those of the other groups. Northway (1940b) 
Reconstruction of Schema, Phase 2: Cognitive Psychology
Schema underwent its most significant change with the rise of cognitive psychology. The use of a computer metaphor of mind and methodology of counting units that go in and come out of a generally fixed system changed schema from a dynamic and embodied concept that incorporated affect and interests, into a static knowledge structure used to represent information in the world 'out there'. This conceptual change was set in motion in Bartlett's own laboratory, where the metaphor of information flow was already beginning to be used to conceptualize person--machine interactions (Wagoner, in prep., ch. 7) .
One of Bartlett's students in the laboratory, Oldfield (1954) , translated schema into the new language of information storage on a computer. Unlike the fixed storage on a wax tablet or photograph, he argued that computer information storage allowed for 're--codings' of elements (i.e., binary code) to economize storage and develop new connections between elements. Reconstruction was then simply a re--coding of elements and schema was the pattern or plan used to do so. This mechanical metaphor of mind spread widely and set the stage for the rise of cognitive psychology.
In an early foundational book of cognitive psychology, Neisser (1967) drew heavily on Bartlett's (1932 Bartlett's ( , 1958 work but did so very selectively in order to fit Bartlett's ideas into the computer metaphor of mind. For example, there is no mention of "an effort after meaning" through which schema enters a mental act in Bartlett's account. Instead, Neisser (1967) clarifies schema through a "program analogy". Programs, like schema, are said to be "a series of instructions" or "recipe for selecting, storing, recovering, combining, outputting, and generally manipulating [information]" (p. 8). With this analogy, Neisser (1967) strictly separates the psychological level of analysis from the bio--functional-the former is the software (program) and the latter is the hardware (machinery)-whereas for Bartlett these were inseparable. Thus, by being defined as a "recipe", "cognitive structure" or "organized representation of prior experience", schema is severed from its location in an active and developing activity. v Furthermore, to describe the process of memory reconstruction, Neisser famously made an analogy with a paleontologist who must assemble a dinosaur skeleton from a pile of bones. Although this is a colorful example, it leads us to think that there are three separate kinds of entities involved in the process of reconstructive remembering-a central executor (the paleontologist), pieces of information (bones) and schema (plan)-and that only the executor is active (Iran--Nejad and Winsler 2000). Because schema is already separate from the executor there is no need for the notion of 'turning around upon ones own schema'. To make the analogy work from a Bartlettian perspective, there would only be bones, which would have to be continuously self--organizing in relation to the changing demands of the museum exhibit.
In the 1970s, a number of new concepts in cognitive psychology were explicitly derived from Bartlett's schema, including Minsky's (1975) Minsky was a computer scientist attempting to develop machines with human like abilities. His concept of frame as "a data--structure for representing a stereotyped situation" (p. 212) clearly reveals this starting point. "A frame" he says, is a network of nodes and relations. The 'top' levels' of a frame are fixed, and represent thing that are always true about the supposed situation.
The lower levels have many terminals-'slots' that must be filled with specific instances or data. Each terminal can specify conditions its assignments must meet. (p. 212)
For example, a schema or frame for a graduate student's room (top level) contains items, such as a desk, calendar, pencils, books, etc (lower level). We are more likely to remember items in the room that are schema consistent than inconsistent, and to add items to our memory of the room which are schema consistent but were not actually present (Brewer and Treyens 1981) . vi Shank and Abelson's (1977) concept of script has the same general form as frame but is organized into a sequence of actions: "A script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines a well--known situation" (p. 41). A restaurant script, for instance, involves the following sequence of actions: enter, get seated, order, eat, pay and leave. Each one of these discrete actions can be further divided into simpler actions, such as 'go to table', 'pull out chair' and 'sit down' or 'get seated'. Scripts are thus a series of isolated and banal actions, with nothing to say about feelings, interests and rationalizations that one finds in Bartlett's work.
Like frames and scripts, Mandler and Johnson's (1977) concept of story grammar or story schema works with the hierarchical network metaphor. They explicitly remove from their consideration of schema Bartlett's notions of "literary style, mood, and various classes of stories" to narrow schema's meaning to "an idealized internal representation of the parts of a typical story and the relationship among these parts" (p. 111). Stories are composed of a setting and an episode, which can be divided into a number of episodes, each with a 'beginning', 'development' and 'end'. The development is further subdivided in 'complex reaction' and 'goal path' and so on. On a horizontal level these nodes are connected by and, then and cause relations. The 'story schema' thus functions as "a set of expectations about the internal structure of stories which serves to facilitate both encoding and retrieval" (p. 112). Analogous to the 'deep grammar' of Chomskian linguistics, story grammar is said to be an innate and universal property of mind. War of the Ghosts is shown to deviate considerably from story schema and as such is considered a bad story in--itself, rather than a story constructed by a culture with different norms, activities and values. Although Mandler and Johnson (1977) do predict a number of omissions in story recall, they do not attend to the variety of different reproductions made by subjects, which so interested Bartlett. Thus, the social as well as the personal dimensions of schema are ignored in their account.
On the back of these developments, in a well--known paper, Rumelhart (1980) would define schema as "a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory" (p. 34). At this point the concept has turned into the opposite of the one put forward by Bartlett, though it is not exactly the trace theory of memory either. Cognitive psychologists do retain a notion of hierarchical organization as in Bartlett. But whereas for Bartlett schema operated as a unitary mass and could not be broken down into elementary units, the above cognitive psychologists put their emphases on elements in different slots or nodes of a static structure. Because the structure is presumed to be relatively static, cognitive psychologists have rarely bothered to do repeated reproduction experiments and when they have they merely compare later reproductions against the original material, whereas Bartlett was as attentive to the changes between one reproduction and another as he was between the original and first reproduction. This is because schemata were said to be always active and developing in relation to interests and the environment. Likewise, Bartlett's focus on functional adaptation to the environment is replaced by a Cartesian view of mind as wholly removed from the world. As such there is no need for or mention of Bartlett's notion of 'turning around upon schema', because schemata are already separate from the embodied organism relating to its environment.
Lastly, early cognitive schema theories wholly ignored attitudes, interests, feelings, rationalizations and a host of other factors, which were central to Bartlett's characterization of reconstruction, which he notably prefixes with 'imaginative'. In short, these cognitive schema theories are spatial (not temporal), static (not developing), focused on elements or nodes (not holistic), passive (not active), individual (not social) and structural (not functional).
I do not mean to suggest by the above that cognitive schema theories have not made some important advances. If I have been more critical of this approach, it is because it is now the taken--for--granted definition of schema in psychology.
Moreover, there has been little recognition that the current definition differs from earlier conceptions; Bartlett is now typically cited alongside these approaches without mentioning the differences that exist between them. Thus, my aim has been to highlight historical discontinuity by pointing out precisely what aspects of the earlier concept of schema have been lost in cognitive psychology's account. I have restricted myself to early cognitive theories of schema to show how the concept emerged in this subfield. There is not space here to discuss the schema--derived theories from the 1980s on. More recent cognitive theories have further developed the concept and in a number of cases some of the above criticisms will no longer apply. However, the general understanding of schema as a knowledge structure in the head and a methodology of counting units coming in and out of a relatively fixed system has remained. In the next section, we will explore recent attempts to reinvent the earlier concept of schema.
Reconstruction of Schema, Phase 3: Ecological and Discursive Psychology
By the late 80s psychologists were beginning to again acknowledge the social and cultural side of Bartlett's thinking. In 1987 Edwards and Middleton published an important article arguing that many important social dimensions of
Remembering had been unjustly forgotten. In the years that followed, these authors and others at Loughborourg University developed a sustained program of research on how discursive norms of different social contexts shape 33 remembering (e.g., Middleton and Edwards, 1990) . Middleton and Brown (2005; his murder narrative (Hara et al., 1997; Ohashi et al. 2002) . Narratives of 'real experiences' took the form of what they called agent-alteration, that is, referring to agents of action (self and others) alternatively, such as "I did… then he did… so I did…" This narrative form parallels Gibson's (1979) "perception--action cycles," the circular interaction between agent and environment in activity. By contrast the murder narrative was characterized by agent-succession, that is, referring to agents successively, such as "I did… there, then I did…"-thus,
suggesting it was confabulated.
Mori (2008) an additional two interrogation sessions took place at two--week intervals. Four participants took part in the study but only one particularly illustrative case was analyzed, following an idiographic approach to theory building (Salvatore and Valsiner 2010) . Table 1 contrasts the differences Mori (2008) found between narratives for the two campuses.
------INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ------First, the agent-alteration/agent-succession contrast Hara et al. (1997) had found in the murder defendant's testimony appears again here. For the directly 35 experienced University, agent--alteration made up 69.2% of the narrative, whereas the percentage is reversed for the indirect experience, in which alteration counts for 41.7%. Second, objects tended to be variously described (e.g., the stairs were 'pretty large', 'curved' and 'grey') in remembering the direct experience, whereas descriptions were poorer for the indirect experience. Third, in the narrative of the direct experience objects tended to be unstably named, while for the indirect experience naming was more stable. For example, a room was called 'a something room', 'a classroom', and 'a room related to information' in remembering the direct experience, whereas for indirect experience a room would be given a single name (Mori, 2008, pp. 300--301) . Fourth, the motivation for certain behavior tended to be explained as being environmentally induced for the direct experience and internally induced (e.g. "I thought" or "I guessed") for the indirect experience. Fifth, the participant expressed hesitation in drawing a map for the direct experience (signaling a struggle to come into experiential contact with the past) and none for the indirect experience. For Mori, these all indicate the operation of different 'organization of schemata' in the two conditions. However, all these differences become less apparent with repeated remembering, as a result of inter--and intrapersonal conventionalization-the former describes what happens when a participant appropriates ways of talking about his or her experience from the interrogator.
Mori's original contribution is to develop an experimental methodology -"the schema approach" (Mori 2009 ) -that is true to Bartlett's insight that remembering is both personal and social. He encompasses the social nature of remembering by devising an experimental situation that models the social context of an interrogation, in either a courtroom or police station. A participant, who was involved in the navigation, engages in the free flow of conversation with a participant "interrogator," who does not know that one of the participant's narratives is a confabulation. The fact that Mori (2008) found differences in narrative form in this experiment similar to the real murder testimony (i.e., agent--alteration/agent--succession) suggests that he has successfully modeled some features of the real situation. Personal experience is brought into his experiment by introducing the body. In most memory experiments the participant is confined to a chair and guided to attend only to the memory stimulus; other features of the experimental situation are simply considered noise to be carefully controlled (Mori 2010) . By contrast, in Mori's experiment it is precisely the experience of bodily movement and perception that the participant remembers (in the narrative of the direct experience) that the experimenter tries to discover. We see the personal experiential qualities of coming into bodily "contact" with an environment expressing themselves subtly in a narrative's form. He shows that the "organization of schemata" in each remembering is different -due to the qualitative dissimilarities in the experiences themselves -and that this difference can be uncovered by analyzing a narrative's form.
Conclusion: The Past, Present and Future of Schema
The history of schema demonstrates how the concept was flexibly adapted to meet the needs of different social contexts, analogous to the process schema itself was meant to describe at an individual level. As the concept of schema has been continuously reconstructed, it has changed from an embodied, dynamic, There are two major obstacles in bringing the Bartlettian concept of schema back into psychology: one meta--theoretical and one methodological. Meta--theoretically, the storage metaphor is both the commonsense and scientific taken--for--granted way of conceptualizing memory. highlights organismic attunement to the environment based on past experience, operating as a background condition rather than as isolated and fixed traces. For example, if one is used to driving a pickup truck this will set the stage for articulating the smoothness of a car's ride. Likewise, remembering involves attunement (an attitude) and contextual information to set the stage on which previous experience is reconstructed within these given constraints.
Methodologically, psychology needs to invent new methods of bringing time, as an indivisible movement, back into its studies. Typically, time is spatialized in psychological research by only considering clock time and by simply counting and averaging items between subjects at one point in time. This fails to address the two questions that Bartlett (1935) set as a research agenda, namely how schemas develop and what are the processes of memory reconstruction. Above I called these a long and short temporality respectively, because both questions necessitate situating psychological processes in the 'irreversibility of time', to borrow a phrase from Bergson. Bartlett (1928) gives an example of the long temporality in relation to Watson and Rayner's (1920) famous experiment on 'little Albert,' who they taught to fear white rats (among other white fluffy things) by presenting a loud noise when the rat was present. From an ecological perspective these psychologists were shaping a certain attunement or 39 orientation to the environment. It is not possible to erase this earlier experience (i.e., reverse time) with white rats but the schema can nonetheless be further developed through new encounters. Bartlett (1928) suggestions introducing another boy into the setting to play with the white rat and for Albert to observe, which will stimulate curiosity to counterbalance the fear. Bartlett's (1932) repeated reproduction method, which analyzes qualitative changes in single cases, is itself a powerful means of exploring the long temporality (Wagoner 2009 ), as are and Mori's (2008) focus on the 'organization of schema' in this process.
Exploring the short temporality was more of a problem for Bartlett in that he had to rely on notes he took while carefully observing his subjects during the experimental task and their occasional comments. Today, we can use video recorders and other technologies, which were unavailable in Bartlett's time, to scrutinize the moment--to--moment processes of remembering in their details. Middleton and Edwards (1990) and Mori (2008) set up a conversational tasks to create conditions in which subjects externalize and objectify their thinking, so as to observe remembering as it occurs and analyze it in its temporal dimensions.
Using the same strategy, Wagoner and Gillespie (in prep) have focused on the long neglected process of 'turning around upon schemata' in reconstruction by attending to what occurs when a train of remembering is ruptured and some gap must be filled in. Reconstruction of previous experiences is shown to be a process of both self and other suggestion and counter suggestion within certain conventional constraints. To theorize these dynamics, the authors draw on Mead's (1934) concept of the significant symbol, through which we respond to 40 our own utterances in the same way that we respond to the utterances of our interlocutor. Thus, the missing mechanism by which we turn around upon schemata is social in origin.
University A (direct experience) University B (indirect experience)
Alteration--dominant narrative Succession--dominant narrative Mori, 2010) .
